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Abstract
Swedish Social Welfare and its Application to American Welfare Systems concerns itself
with the issue of determining the origins of the modern Swedish social welfare system.
Additionally, the causes behind the formation of the system are evaluated for their relevancy
concerning the formation of the American welfare system. Multiple areas of study are
considered, including racial impacts, economic factors, sociological impactors, and demographic
variables.
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Introduction
In America, the average inpatient day, regardless whether the hospital is for-profit or
non-profit, commonly costs an average of more than 2,000 dollars per day. Arkansas, despite
being one of the cheaper states in which to go to the hospital, averages a cost of more than 1,500
dollars per inpatient day. (Rappleye 2015) Average hospital stays in America cost 10,400
dollars and run around 4-5 days total. (Elixhauser and Weiss, 2012) These visits alone,
consisting of only a part of the private citizen health care spending in the country, not only affect
a large portion of the population but also constitute a significant impact on the economy of the
United States. In 2012 alone, 36.5 million people were hospitalized, or 116 per 1,000
population. This resulted in an economic cost of more than 370 billion dollars.
The International Federation of Health Plans, in a 2012 report, found that the price of an
average day in an average American hospital was as costly as a similar daylong stay in a hospital
in the countries of Argentina, Spain, South Africa, the Netherlands, France, Chile, New Zealand,
and Australia combined. At the same time, the same report noted that out of all these countries,
in 2010, the United States, despite its emphasis on the presumed efficiencies of privatized health
insurance, spent 17% of its GDP on health spending-the OECD average is 9.5% for the same
year, and the closest any of the above countries comes to America’s figure is France; far, far
back at 11.6%. (International Federation of Health Plans 2012)
The World Bank estimates American total health expenditure, which is “the sum of
public and private health expenditure… it covers the provision of health services (preventive and
curative), family planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for
health” at 17.1% from the period from 2010-2015. (World Bank 2016) At the same time, in the
notorious WHO ranking from 2000 concerning the quality of various countries healthcare
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systems, America came in 37th, despite being first in expenditure per capita. (Blackstone and
Taylor, 2012) One cannot help but take these facts, and others, into consideration, see the
underperformance and the overspending, and wonder if there is not some way to make
improvements on the American medical welfare system.
Among scholars seeking to analyze the effects of the American welfare system,
comparison is often easily made to the “welfare states” common among developed in places like
Europe. This can have a range of meanings; people might refer to Canada’s nearly free public
health care, or the high taxes-high benefits states common in the Nordic countries and to a
certain degree across the European mainland. A welfare state is defined by Merriam Webster as
“a social system in which a government is responsible for the economic and social welfare of its
citizens and has policies to provide free health care, support for the unemployed, etc.; also : a
country that has such a system”. (Merriam-Webster 2016) This can obviously apply to varying
degrees; America has enacted numerous policies with the intent to provide for the economic and
physical well-being of its citizenry, as have many other developed countries. At the same time,
however, the degree of implementation and the focus placed on these policies can vary from
place to place. As such, it is essential in the examination of an alternative to the modern
American welfare system that a social welfare state be found that can be considered a strong
example of a different approach than that taken by the United States.
In searching for a strong contrast to the capitalist focused American welfare system, the
Nordic countries are the first to come to mind for many academics. Commonly the first
countries thought of when the phrase “social welfare state” is put forth, the Nordics are famous
for their pioneering modernization combined with efficient social welfare policies. To quote the
Economist in 2013, “If you had to be reborn anywhere in the world as a person with average
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talents and income, you would want to be a Viking.” (Economist 2013) The question then
becomes which specific country is the best selection as a counterpart. Sweden is the immediate
logical conclusion-the largest population, landmass, economy, and a long social and political
history. In short, it provides the largest population and sample size for comparison to the
gigantic statistical enterprise that is the analysis of the United States. The increase in sample size
also serves to ameliorate potential error in both quantitative statistical records and data gathering,
and in qualitative evaluation, both independent and based on these aforementioned statistics.
Having arrived at a study site to research, the question now presents itself: How did
Sweden arrive at its modern iteration of a welfare state? During what period did the social
welfare state come into its modern form? And, primarily, what factors contributed significantly
to the formation of the social welfare state, and, concerning the comparison with the United
States, are these same formative factors identifiable in the history of that country? In short, what
are the factors necessary for the formation of a Swedish-style welfare state, and have the same
factors co-occurred in a similar fashion in the United States?
That America is at a crossroads of social welfare policy is clear. Popular support for the
Obama presidency despite his avowed intent to implement the PPACA (Obamacare)
demonstrated a significant popular support for increased social welfare policy in the European
vein. (Pew Research Center 2015) At the same time, inequality and vested interests interfering
in government activities are experiencing a significant increase; and these are problems
specifically opposed by Scandinavian states and Sweden in particular, and problems important to
a significant portion of American citizenry as well, as evidenced by the popular success of
candidates performing well in elections occupying roles of “government outsiders”. (Silver
2016)
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That the area of study responsible for undertaking this analysis be geography is of
essential import to the overall function of the analysis. Social welfare, in a sense, manifests as a
reflection of scale. Specifically, Sweden, a smaller, more homogenous society, which is also
geographically less significant than the larger and more diverse United States, possesses fewer
racial and cultural boundaries to obstruct the implementation of more egalitarian social
programs.
At the same time, the issue of health care is very much an issue spanning multiple
spheres of analysis. Geography, as the discipline perhaps most suited to analysis across spheres
as varying as economic history and societal racism, is uniquely suited as the optimal lens through
which to evaluate the matter of the origin and evolution of Swedish social welfare, and by
extension, its American counterpart. The flexibility to evaluate and assess how different study
areas interact and effect each other within the overall sphere of social welfare is of paramount
importance.
The status of America as a world leader is very, very much in question concerning its
performance in the simple health care and benefits afforded to its citizens. Geographic study of
the formational variables behind the rise of the modern-day Swedish welfare state system can be
essential not only in determining the formational variables of an academically valuable study
site, but in providing a crucial research aid in the study of and application of solutions to
America’s modern day welfare issues-solutions that are sorely needed as the health insurance
crisis in America continues to cause further distress to the economy and the population.
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Literature Review
At its heart, geography is a multidisciplinary science. Sub-focuses of the field of
geography range from innovative geospatial analysis techniques to the studious analysis of
resource exploitation, the study of political systems, the settling of cities, and a hundred other
applications. It is thus that I posit the appropriateness of geography in being the correct, and
only, discipline with which to utilize the almost multidisciplinary approach necessary to analyze
the formation of Swedish welfare.
When one asks the question “what are the factors necessary for the formation of a
Swedish-style welfare state, and have the same factors co-occurred in a similar fashion in the
United States” one cannot say, for example, that “This answer is economic in nature”, or “This
answer can be answered solely by an analysis of Swedish demographics”.

To do so is to ignore

the wealth of alternative formative influences on such a collection of institutions that would
irretrievably diminish the legitimacy of the research.
At the same time, such a narrow focus on a single area of study lends credence to the idea
that such singular interest on a single topic area in regard to such a broad a subject as the
formation of Swedish social welfare, with so many influencing factors, leaves wide open the
possibility that factors deemed significant by their role within the single topic area may result in
the attribution of significance to historical progressions and events that may be insignificant
when one steps back to understand the multidisciplinary inputs required to truly understand the
formative influences of the welfare state. For example, the Swedish timber industry in the 19th
century was a major part of the Swedish economy. In 1850, timber accounted for 15% of
Swedish exports-a mere two decades later, it accounted for more than half of the Swedish export
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market, and the export value had increased by three times over. (Östlund 1995) At first glance,
when examined among the spectrum of the economic history of Sweden, this may seem a crucial
economic step in the evolution of Sweden as a country; but stepping back, the question as to its
significance in the formation of the Swedish welfare state arises. If lumped under the common
banner of Swedish industrialization-itself wildly important in its impact on modern day Swedenmuch as with every industrialized country-19th century timber statistics lose a certain measure of
their perceived importance when viewed through a narrow economic-only lens.
The point is not that economics is an unimportant subject matter, or that individual
subject areas are insignificant in comparison to some greater gestalt approach. Rather, the
argument is that all of the individual spheres of influence on the formation of the Swedish
welfare state are anything but insignificant. However, they must be analyzed in such a way as to
keep the multifactorial nature of the formative processes of the welfare state in mind, lest the
quantitative statistics and the qualitative conclusions stray into the realm of insignificance or risk
error based on insignificant data points. (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens, 1993) To explain the
direction of the analysis in a spatial sense, it is important to take into account the nature of
Sweden as an entire spatial entity as being critical in the formation of its modern-day welfare
state form. In this vein of significance and a multidisciplinary approach, the methods of
approach concerning the analysis of the Swedish welfare state formation have been deemed
critical by a variety of academics. The question arises; which areas should be focused on? In a
review of the work of noted social welfare state researcher Harold Wilensky by Martin Danzig,
Danzig notes the crucial nature of Wilensky’s multidirectional approach to the issues underlying
the formation of the social welfare states that he studies. He argues the interrelated significance
of economic, political, and social/demographic factors. (Danzig 1977) Multiple other scholars,
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such as Daniel Bell and Arthur Vidich utilize a similar multidisciplinary approach also using the
same methodology. It is thus proposed that it is only logical to assume the heightened efficacy of
a multidisciplinary examination of the formative factors behind 20th century Swedish welfare
policy implementation.
The Formational Period of the Swedish Welfare System
In analyzing the formational factors of the Swedish welfare state, an understanding of the
relevant time period is paramount. The temporal scale of the research cannot be ignored if the
correct time period, and thus the correct factors, are to be taken into consideration. Different
spheres of influence may have different respective time periods, but an overall, comprehensive,
multifaceted analysis must present an inclusive timeframe with which to analyze the formation
of Swedish social welfare. Schall identifies the social aspects of the formation of the welfare
state as extending back to the mid-1920s, and lasting until the mid-1970s and the first significant
wave of immigration to Sweden and the subsequently increasing heterogeneity of the population.
(Schall 2016) Hancock, in 1976, argued a generalized formational time period starting at the
beginning of the 19th century, in line with increasing industrialization and the rise of the Social
Democrat party. (Hancock 1977) Schiff argues the significant time period of welfare policy
formation began with the rise of the Social Democratic party to power in 1932. (Schiff 1974) In
The Small Giant, Carl Gustavson places the weight of importance strongly on the preindustrial
period before World War One, and additionally on the formative period between World War One
and the start of the 1980s. (Gustavson 1986) Heclo and Madsen, in Policy and Politics in
Sweden, assign the welfare state a formative period lasting the duration of what they deem
noteworthy policy implementation, from 1909-1978. (Heclo and Madsen, 1987)) As
summarized by Eric Einhorn, noted researcher of the Swedish welfare state Sven Olsson posits
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the end of the Swedish welfare state formational period as the start of the 1970s. (Einhorn 1992)
Regardless of the formative periods espoused by these varying academics, the same theme is
seen throughout; that of the alleged formative period varying depending on which singular
element they espouse as the most critical to welfare state formation; be it politics, social
pressure, homogeneity of the population, or an increase in economic activity.
Prior Research on the Swedish Welfare State
Carly Elizabeth Schall notes the importance of the political aspects of the foundation of
the social welfare state, along with the interrelated importance of the demographic situation in
Sweden. Schall argues that not only was the welfare state founded on a populist political
motivation, but also that the aforementioned political drive was concocted in large part through
an emphasis of the homogeneity of the population. She also argues that not only is the Swedish
welfare state unique in that it was designed specifically for the Swedish population, by the
Swedish population, but also that the nation of Sweden and the culture of Sweden have come to
be defined to some degree by their chosen form of welfare policy implementation; a concept she
labels as the welfare “stateification of Swedishness”. (Schall 2016) Valocchi argues that unique
Swedish circumstances leading to reduced inequality and heightened sensitivity to agrarian work
sector demands led to a broader implementation of welfare state policy, or at least engendered
the idea of such activity, until it was driven into being by the Social Democrats. (Valocchi 1992)
Sven Olsson, as reviewed by Eric Einhorn, argues, among other things, that industrialization
paved the way for solidarity among the industrializing Sweden population. Olsson also rejects
Harvard historian Peter Baldwin’s assertion that Swedish conservatives were responsible for the
main driving thrust of Swedish welfare state policy implementation in the post-World War Two
era. (Einhorn 1992) In this he indirectly reaffirms the repeated theme of Social Democratic
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importance in the political sphere of the formation of the Swedish welfare state. In a study
produced by the Harvard Institute of Economic Research, the researchers argue that homogeneity
drives the social welfare impetus at the political level in European-style welfare states, ostensibly
including the homogenous Sweden. (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001) In total, however,
very few of these studies, however, devote anything but lip service to other spheres of influence
on the formation of the welfare state system as being anything but secondary to the overall
importance of political and their associated demographic factors, or vice versa, and none of them
focus on anything more than their primary position of focus.
Economically, a wealth of studies exists in regard to the Swedish social welfare system as
to beggar the imagination, much of it produced by the formidable Swedish academic machine
itself. In regard to the formation of formation of the Swedish welfare state and its economic
drivers, numerous different studies have arisen. In An Economic History of Sweden, Lars
Magnusson cites, among a comprehensive discussion of a vast multitude of factors concerning
Swedish economic evolution, the industrialization of Sweden as being crucial to the
implementation of the social policies that would drive the rise of the modern-day welfare state.
(Magnusson 2000, 177) Milner writes in Sweden: Social Democracy in Practice that the rise of
the Swedish welfare state started with the economic advantages afforded by state moderation of
economic policy. (Milner 1989 22-33) Sandberg and Steckel argue the industrialization in
Sweden led directly to a higher quality of life through the instrument of social welfare reform.
(Sandberg and Steckel 132) Borg and Vedin argue that Swedish technological advances cooccurring with and driving the Industrial Revolution helped Sweden to achieve the enviable
economic conditions it enjoyed during the post-World War Two era, when combined with their
lack of involvement in either World War. The lack of infrastructure destruction in either World
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War deserves mention as a driver of the following uptick in economic fortune in Sweden. Borg
and Vedin are among a few of the many who espouse the importance of this fortune in driving
future economic development and prosperity. (Borg and Vedin 1982)
That the formational aspects of Swedish welfare are as described is unsurprisingeconomics, social factors, politics and demographics are core principles driving state formation
in the modern era, and have done the same back through history for thousands of years. At the
same time, that none of these variables are analyzed en masse as a greater combined formative
influence is surprising. In this narrow focus can be seen a paucity in previous research, a
weakness needing to be addressed by a more comprehensive analysis taking into account the
potential for multiple significant influences on policy implementation. That such a narrow focus
has been taken by so many leading researchers of the Swedish social welfare state is surprising,
and perhaps a result of the lack of geographically centered analysis, which can trend towards
more the lacking multidisciplinary analysis perhaps more appropriate to the specified research
question at hand.
Prior Analysis on the American Welfare State
That the American welfare state lags behind in its degree of implementation in
comparison to many European countries and other OECD nations is unsurprising. The American
welfare state has been described as “reluctant” by Harold Wilensky, “a semi-welfare state” by
Bruce Jansson, a “welfare state laggard” by Michael Katz, “a residual welfare state” by Robert
Kudrle and Theodore Marmor, and an “incomplete welfare state” by Diane Sainsbury. (Howard
2003) (LeBeaux and Wilensky, 1965) (Jansson 2001) (Katz 1986) (Kudrle and Marmor, 1981)
(Sainsbury 1996)
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At the same time, direct comparisons between the foundational factors of the Swedish
welfare system and the American welfare system are remarkable only in their complete absence.
Yves Bourdet noted sourly the academic disinterest for research into the viability of other
economic approaches as a result of a proposed American-centered domination of economic
analysis in the 20th century. Even Bourdet’s collection of studies comparing the Swedish model
with other countries only extended to an analysis of Sweden in relation to other European
countries that ostensibly display a much greater proximity to the generalized Swedish social
welfare ideal than would the United States. (Bourdet 1992, 2) Studies have been produced that
have attempted to analyze the formative factors behind American social welfare policy, such as
the Harvard Institute of Economics study titled “Why Doesn’t the US have a European-style
Welfare State”, but direct comparison to Sweden and a true multidisciplinary analysis have been
lacking. (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001)
In summary, it is thus posited that two key gaps exist in the modern research collection
concerning the study of Swedish social welfare and the factors significant in its formation, and
their subsequent potential mirrored applications to the United States. Firstly, the comprehensive
analysis of the significant formational drivers of Swedish social welfare, while heavily analyzed
by the academic community, is lacking in multidisciplinary analyses, and even more so in
analyses that take into account more than one potential variable, and even then, variables are
often to intertwined as to consist of a single thought process, for example, sociopolitical.
Additionally, direct comparison of the multidisciplinary factors behind (specifically) Swedish
social welfare policy formation with their potential mirror occurrences or lack thereof in the
United States is a research topic particularly lacking. Therefore, the it is contended that a gap in
the modern research for the question of “what are the factors necessary for the formation of a
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Swedish-style welfare state, and have the same factors co-occurred in a similar fashion in the
United States” not only exists but is necessary for a more comprehensive analysis of the subject
matter at hand.
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Study Site
In examining the factors leading to the formation of what is now the modern-day Swedish
welfare state system and the potential parallels with the past, present, or future United States of
America, one must first carefully define exactly what is meant by “welfare state”. Encyclopedia
Britannica describes a welfare state as being a “concept of government in which the state or a
well-established network of social institutions plays a key role in the protection and promotion of
the economic and social well-being of citizens. It is based on the principles of equality of
opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and public responsibility for those unable to avail
themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life.” (Encyclopedia Britannica 2015) This
definition, while helpful, is rather general. In particular, we are interested in the specific factors
leading to the formation of the Swedish welfare state, and as such, determining a more precise
idea of the modern-day Swedish end product is imperative. In addition, the very nature of a
welfare state is inherently one relative to the nature of the degree to which the aforementioned
“social institutions” (examples including the United States’ Social Security or the United
Kingdom’s National Health Service) protect and engender the economic and social well-being of
citizens.
As previously stated, I will attempt to determine the key foundational roots of this
welfare system and the degree to which it is employed in the sovereign nation of Sweden is
based on three significant factors; political factors(including such topics as ruling party/coalition
continuity), economics, and demographics. At the same time, if an examination is to be made
into the nature of these conditions for welfare state formation in regard to the viability of such a
window for change in the climate of the past, present, or future United States, these significant
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factors, when described in the Swedish setting, must then be presented alongside their American
counterparts.
Sweden Political Factors
Viking Era
Large-scale Viking activity is thought to have predated the sixth century C.E. and lasted
more than 600 years into the 12-13th centuries, before internal and external pressures brought an
end to and a transition out of pan-Nordic Viking culture. Externally, Vikings were focused on
acquisition through trading or warfare. The method would depend in large part on the particular
Vikings, be they Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, etc., and the specific groups with which they
came into contact, be they from Western Europe, the Mediterranean region, or even the Middle
East. Swedish Vikings in particular were noted for their trade with the Arabs, which served to
facilitate acquisition of silver, among other resources. (National Museum of Denmark 2016)
These Viking excursions, be they peaceful or warlike, would help to set the boundaries of
Viking society. In what would prove to be a remarkably egalitarian distribution of responsibility
in regard to military responsibilities, regions in Viking areas were split up into areas called
“hundreds”, with each area obligated to provide a certain number of ships and men to crew them,
a figure crucially determined by the affluence and population of the hundred in question.
Another cooperative, socialistic institution of the Viking Age was the development by the
Swedish Vikings of a beacon system along the east coast of Scandinavia, with the intended
purpose of facilitating overall sea travel. (Jones 2001, 121) These early proto-redistributive
programs would be precursors to the modern Swedish welfare system.
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The Riksdag
It was also during this period that the nascent Swedish parliament, the Riksdag, was
slowly growing into its modern-day self. In 1809, after a long period of marginalization of the
Riksdag and promotion of the powers of the monarch, a new constitution was established firmly
denoting the division of powers between the king and the parliament. A separation of different
branches of government-judicial, legislative, and executive, was established, along with the
granted independence of courts and public authorities. (Government of Sweden 2016b) In 1865,
the Riksdag became a bicameral body, consisting of an upper house of mostly wealthy elites and
nobility, while the lower house was open to more middle-class representatives. (Government of
Sweden 2016b) By this time, suffragist movements were gaining traction in Swedish society,
and by 1862, women in several differing economic groups were allowed to vote. By the early
1900s, these same women were allowed to hold office, and by 1918, universal suffrage in local
elections was established. (Government of Sweden 2016b)In the revolutionary period following
World War One, near-universal suffrage was achieved (excepting groups such as prisoners, the
bankrupted, and those dependent on a certain threshold of government aid) and five women were
elected to the Riksdag in 1921. (Government of Sweden 2016b) This system would persist
more or less unchanged until the two houses of the Riksdag united in 1971, and the new, modern
day constitution was written in 1974. The primary change to the Riksdag after this new
constitution was established was the Speaker having a key role in the formation of coalition
governments, and the unicameral nature of the legislative branch.
Examination of the Riksdag leads to the discovery of a driving force of Swedish social
welfare reform. That force is the Social Democrat political party, which has dominated Swedish
politics since its first majority in parliament in 1932. Since that election, the Social Democrats
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have led the government for all but 16 years- a startling figure for someone more accustomed to
American political volatility. The Swedish political system has historically possessed a wider
range of parties than would be expected by an average American- 5-8 parties have historically
been represented in the legislature throughout the modern history of the Riksdag. (Government
of Sweden 2016b) The Social Democrats, following a united coalition government during the
trials of World War 2, led a relatively unaffected and unharmed Sweden into the changed postwar climate with a remarkable amount of pragmatism and an unshakeable devotion to the
establishment of what is today known as the Swedish model of welfare state formation. While
the foundation of the Swedish welfare state was laid with Depression-era policies such as the
establishment of the old-age pension system in 1937, the vast majority of welfare policies were
enacted in the time of relative economic prosperity following World War 2. (European
Commission 2013) (Heclo and Madsen 1987, 49)) The Social Democrats have continued to
lead Sweden through a series of coalition governments almost continuously through the
economic crises of the 1970s and the globalization rush of the 1990s, and still lead the Swedish
nation today following the 2014 election.
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United States Political Factors
The youth of America as a country, along with the assortment of cultures and political
backgrounds inherent to its immigrant populations’ countries of origin, makes the analysis of the
political factors inherent in its policymaking a decidedly more modern affair than the more longlasting political entity that is Sweden.

Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of American politics

is the historical absence of a large number of parties in presidential and congressional elections.
By far the most telling indicator of this is the lack of successful third party candidates in
American presidential elections throughout the history of the United States. The modern era has
been dominated by the Republican and Democratic parties; with the earlier decades of American
political history seeing the competition of parties such as the Federalists, the Whigs, and the
Democrat-Republicans. (World Atlas 2016) Perhaps the only noteworthy third-party effort in
American political history is Teddy Roosevelt’s attempt to run as the candidate of his own party
upon failing to receive the Republican nomination. Regardless, Roosevelt was defeated, and his
campaign’s notoriety lies more or less solely in promoting the least unsuccessful third party
candidate in American political history.
This state of affairs, of course, lies in sharp contrast to the aforementioned party diversity
of Swedish politics; along with dozens of minor parties and local parties, Sweden has eight major
parties represented in parliament; the Social Democratic, Conservative, Ecologist, Liberal,
Agrarian, Nationalist, Christian Democratic, and Communist parties, and a current ruling
coalition of Social Democrats and the Green Party, as of the latest Riksdag election in 2014; an
election which saw the end of the previous ruling coalition of center-right parties. (European
Election Database 2015) The lack of party diversity in American directly leads to a lack of
involvement in the voter turnout; according to the Pew Research Center, only 53.6% of the
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population of voting age adults turned out for the 2012 presidential election, 31st out of 34
OECD countries, whereas Sweden came in third with 82.6% participation. (DeSilver 2015) At
the same time, relatively convoluted American voter registration practices, in some cases a
legacy from racism leftover from slavery issues more than a century past the Civil War, lead to
low voter registration, and subsequently additionally infringe on voter turnout. (Powell 1986)
American registered voters consist of a relatively poor 71% of the voting age citizenry,
compared to 96% for Sweden. (DeSilver 2015)
A key difference in post-World War Two American and Swedish political scenes
concerns the perceived influence of communism in the political agenda. Whereas in the United
States, communism was seen as the archenemy, emblematic of the rival superpower, the USSR,
in Sweden, it was viewed through a more pragmatic lens-following the war, high-ranking and
influential Social Democrat Gunner Myrdal postulated that major post-war depression was
imminent, and that the only alternative to high post-war unemployment was through extensive
government regulation and some form of command economy. (Magnusson 2000, 221)
Fortunately for the Swedes, this recession never materialized and the economy instead
took off, but the lack of opposition to these claims by the leading party at the time serves to
admirably illuminate the lack of opposition to certain aspects of communism permeating the
government of Sweden. In America, however, communists were labeled as spies and traitors to
the great good of capitalism, both overtly through public spectacles such as McCarthyism, etc.,
and subconsciously with the use of propaganda and other methods. (Belmonte 2013) (Bernhard
2003) At the same time, the near constant American involvement in proxy wars, along with
direct involvement in Vietnam and Korea, in opposition to communist regimes, painted
communism and concepts related to it as the enemy for generations of American citizens and
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present and future/modern day policymakers. This would trickle over into a general distaste for
policies deemed “socialist” by the general public, as seen even into the current presidential
election with the controversy surrounding the avowed “socialist” candidate, Bernie Sanders.
Summarily, while United States’ government structure in a general sense is very similar
to that of Sweden-judicial, legislative, executive-along with relatively well-educated voter bases
and a long history of democracy, Sweden and the United States differ politically on a wide range
of issues, be they the number of political parties, the sociological and political aversion to
communism and its associations, or lack thereof, voter turnout, and ease of registration. These
differences help form the backbone delineating the differences between American social welfare
policy and the Swedish welfare state and its associated policies.
Swedish Economics
Research into the economic variables surrounding the evolution of social welfare systems
in Scandinavia has been ongoing for decades.

An argument can be made for each of what are

conventionally considered the Scandinavian countries (Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, and
Denmark) to be selected as an ideal study site for the analysis of the economic factors
influencing social welfare policy. Norway, with its remarkably high GDP PPP, provides a look at
a government emphasizing Scandinavian-style social welfare with perhaps the largest amount of
economic freedom combined with inclination to implement Scandinavian social welfare-style
policies in the world. No significant population size with what could be regarded as a classical
Scandinavian style system of social policies can come close to matching the Norwegian GDP
PPP per capita, which leaves Norway in an enviable position to act on its broad tax base in
whatever policy-making fashion it might so choose to entertain. This would, of course, allow for
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the analysis of the full capacities of such policymaking ideals in an environment as unfettered as
possible by the restraints of economic cost.

Figure 1: GDP PPP in the Scandinavian countries (CIA World Factbook 2016)
Finland, on the other hand, offers the relatively harsher path down analysis of social
welfare policy. With negative GDP growth from 2013-2015, and the lowest GDP PPP, GDP,
and GDP PPP per capita among the Scandinavian five, Finland offers a prime opportunity to
research what policies these populations and their representatives deem most essential in a time
of relative economic downturn, and in what is arguably, in terms of government income
concerning available capital spending on a per capita population basis, the most trying economy
in Scandinavia. Admittedly, despite the negative GDP growth rate from 2013-2015, most
economies, and most populations, would love to be in the position Finland finds itself in terms of
quality of life and other metrics. Regardless, however, if one must look for the most suboptimal
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economic conditions for policymaking among the Scandinavian options, the Finnish are the
obvious choice.
It is, of course, my contention that Sweden, despite the aforementioned arguments, best
serves as the study site through which Scandinavian social welfare policies can be best analyzed,
along with their potential implantation, or missed implementation, in the United States. Sweden
is, first and foremost, the largest population among the Scandinavian countries by a significant
margin, and covers the largest area of land in the region, coming in at just under the size of
California, making it one of the larger European states. Economically, the Swedes also have far
and away outstripped their neighbors in terms of sheer economic scale, with a higher GDP, GDP
PPP, and labor force. The
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Figure 2: GDP and GDP PPP comparison in the Scandinavian countries (World Bank 2017)
aforementioned all-important intertwining of economic ability with the ability to enact
meaningful social welfare policy in the modern era is a crucial aspect of the Scandinavian study
site that obviously cannot be ignored. Additionally, the simplistically beneficial capacities of
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what is simply a larger sample size cannot be understated, given the end goal necessary to
analyzing the overall question is the comparison of the Swedish study site with an industrializing
and also a modern day United States of America; a much larger entity, on a much greater scale.
Regardless, as both are highly modern, “westernized”, industrialized countries, the
United States and Sweden have many things in common, both demographically and
economically; however, through what in large part is a significant policy and social diversion
between the two however, many per capita statistics; which we must use given the vast disparity
in lump sum statistics between these two very differently sized and populated countries, also
show significant departures between American and Swedish statistical patterns.
First, economically, the United States economy dwarfs the substantial but relatively
insignificant Swedish economy. Per capita statistical analyses, as previously mentioned, do,
however, offer a more efficacious approach to determining the parallels between the two. GDP
PPP per capita numbers for both countries are relatively high, with the United States coming in
to what would amount for second place among the Scandinavian countries. GDP growth rate for
both economies from 2013-2015 is also remarkably similar. However, there are also dramatic
statistical gaps between a large number of Swedish and American economic variables, gaps that
will serve as useful baselines for which to analyze the overarching query. That these statistical
gaps are at least in part related to Scandinavian tax policy, social welfare systems, etc. is
undeniable, but the effects of these gaps on economic dynamism, etc. is somewhat open to
debate. Regardless, when one compares Sweden to the United States in a variety of measures
regarding egalitarian economic policy, the United States and Sweden fall
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Figure 3: GDP PPP Per Capita comparison between the United States and Sweden (CIA World
Factbook 2016a) (World Bank 2017)
very, very far apart on many metrics of economic equality. The Swedish Gini coefficient,
despite rising significantly in the two decades since the Scandinavian banking crises of the
1990s, still clocks in much lower than the OECD average, and vastly lower than the American
Gini; which, despite varying from source to source, be it the OECD report on Gini coefficients
for 2015, Forbes 2015 data, or the Allianz report on global wealth disparity, is between the
highest and the fourth highest in the world among what are rather universally considered
developed countries. (The Economist, 2012) (OECD 2016a) (Sherman 2015) (Allianz 2015)
Additionally, in 2015 Allianz calculated for the first time global wealth inequality, which differs
from the Gini measurement of income inequality, but takes into account many of the same
variables, and found that the United States again tops the list.
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Figure 4: Comparison between Swedish and American government economic indicators (Allianz
2015)
Other measures also demonstrate the increased inequality evident in American economics
vs. Swedish economics, where government benefits are of course more commonplace, such as
the unemployment rate, the percent of taxes and other similar incomes as % of the national GDP,
the budget surplus/deficit, and the percentage of public debt as a percentage of the GDP.
Modern day economic comparisons, while efficacious in many regards, are equaled in
their necessity by the importance of historical economic analysis. Firstly, a glimpse into the
economic history of Sweden can offer crucial insight concerning the conditions surrounding and
driving the impetus behind the formation of the economic foundation of the modern Swedish
social system. In sharp contrast to its status as a relatively affluent nation, Sweden has not
always been a beacon of economic prosperity. In 1799 the noteworthy English economist
Thomas Malthus visited Scandinavia to gather information for the follow up work to his Essay
on the Principles of Population, and was stunned by the breadth of the poverty he witnessed,
noting a population barely surviving on “bark bread” and sorrel grass, and resembling so many
“Quakers in morning”, so downtrodden was their attitude. (Magnusson 2000, 1)

25
Up to the beginning of the 18th century, and the beginning of the onset of the
Agricultural Revolution, Sweden was stuck in what was, for the majority of the primarily
agrarian-based populations of northern Europe, a sort of economic/agrarian holding pattern, in
which the majority of the harvest went towards individual consumption for the sake of simple
survival and the rest was eaten up by an arrangement of taxes and other such fees. Bracketed by
the pre-agricultural boom of the very early 1700s and the noteworthy “final” famine of the
1860s, Sweden experienced an extended and comprehensive period of agricultural productivity
increase. (Dribe 2003) Varying statistical contributions from a variety of Swedish scientists
firmly illustrate the general increases in production during this time. Eli Hekscher estimated that
grain production increased by 75% from 1720-1815. Gustaf Utterstrom estimated total growth in
the production of grain and potatoes of between 60-100% during the period between 1815-1860.
Lennart Schon estimated annual vegetable production growth of around half a percent a year
from 1815-1850. (Magnusson 2003, 3) Regardless of the individual figures, however, the clear
trend of increased agricultural yield and productivity is readily apparent. As is the case with
agricultural revolutions across history, increased agricultural production frees up members of the
population to move out of the agricultural sector and into other areas of work, driving
innovation, and in this case, Swedish industrialization, which began in earnest in the latter half of
the 19th century, and continued onwards from there, reaching its peak as Sweden emerged
relatively unscathed from World War Two onto the greater economic world stage. (Government
of Sweden 2016c)
As with many countries during the early periods of industrialization, the increased
agricultural yield led to economic upturns in other areas. Sweden is fortunate to contain natural
resources crucial to industrializing societies; namely, iron and timber. (United States Congress
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1963) At the same time as these domestic resources fed the industrialization of Sweden, they
also fed the industrialization of other countries in Northern Europe, primarily with the United
Kingdom, and this transit of raw materials would see innovation return to Sweden in the form of
applicable new technologies.

(Bosworth and Maiolo, 2015)

This growth, however, even as it continued through World War One and onwards into the
1920s, was somewhat stifled given the Great Depression and the subsequent, at best awkward,
state of economic affairs perpetrated by German intervention in the Scandinavian Peninsula
during World War Two, an intervention coincidentally driven by the requirement by the Nazi
war machine for Swedish iron ore. (Bosworth and Maiolo 2015) As with most of the western
world, any economic takeoff would have to wait until the completion of World War 2. Sweden
was particularly slow to emerge right out of the gate in the post-war period-fears of a post-war
recession kept wartime regulations and restrictions in place in many cases until the late 1950s.
(Magnusson 2000, 204) However, following dramatic capital investment in the 1950s and the
startling postwar technology growth both in Sweden and worldwide, the Swedes experienced
unprecedented economic prosperity. (Magnusson 2000, 203-204) The Social Democrats, who
were in control of Swedish politics for the duration of this period, would leverage their success
into finalizing the establishment of their long-desired welfare strategies and social policies. This
movement was aided by the natural economic narrowing of the income gap due to the sheer
prosperity being experienced at the time. While this phenomenon was notable even in the 1930s,
it was truly realized in the prosperity of the post-war period. (Magnusson 2000, 201) In the end,
this combination of economic factors-prosperity, stability, the natural narrowing of the wage gap,
and to a lesser extent the universal undertaking of rationing and material limitation, would be
important contributors to the establishment of the modern Swedish welfare state.
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American Economics
When examining American economic history in relation to periods in which the
establishment of a welfare state similar in capacity to that of Sweden, one is fortunate in being
able to narrow down the timeframe to the post-industrial era. No comprehensive modern welfare
state has emerged prior to the beginning of the Industrial Era in a country as of yet. As such, the
American Industrial Revolution, beginning around the last decade of the 18th century, is an
excellent starting point at which to analyze American economics up until the modern era. At the
start of the American Industrial Revolution, according to the United States census of 1790,
around 90% of the population was employed in the agrarian sector. (United States Census 1790)
In 1890, the number of non-farm workers surpassed the number of farm workers for the first
time, and, 200 years later, in 1990, farmers made up less than three percent of the US labor force.
Much as in Sweden, capital investment and technological advancements, paralleled by the
expansion of business interests and the rise of corporations, would drive industrial progress.
(Investopedia 2015)
It was the second stage of the American Industrial Revolution, however, which began to
come to fruition nearly a century later that would prove the defining study site for American
emergence into a modern industrial society. This was preceded by the increasing urbanization of
American populations in the period between the Civil War and World War 1. Along with this
wave of urbanization came an increasing concentration of industrial facilities, a greater focus on
sanitation, the rise of unionization, and the communication revolution that came about with the
implementation of the radio and the telephone into everyday life. This would see the start of a
wave of economic growth in the United States, that, despite a significant slippage following the
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Stock Market Crash in 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression, would rebound by the end of
World War 2 and emerge into the dominant post-war economy. (Scranton 2000)
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Figure 5: US GDP per capita growth 1871-2009 (Visualizing Economics 2011)
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Figure 6: Various countries and regions’ percentage of global GDP over time (Drabble 2016)
In this, America shares similarities with Sweden in that the events of World War Two,
while radically different for both countries, with Sweden being firmly in the German geopolitical
arena, and America at the forefront of the forces of the larger Allied western nations, would
instigate strong economic development in the post-war arena, in large part due to the relative
lack of population loss and, most importantly, infrastructure damage, taken during the events of
the war. (Government of Sweden 2016c) In many cases, industries developed in such a way as
to increase productivity and output due to the demands of the war efforts for both nations.
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(Magnusson 2000, 202) Combined with the aforementioned similarities in economic outlooks
following the co-occurring post-war boom for both Sweden and the United States, it is only
logical to look closely at the period directly following World War 2 as a strong candidate for
inclusion as a part of the formati of Swedish social welfare.
Swedish Demographics
Separating ethnic demographic data for the country of Sweden is a particularly difficult
task, given that there are no official statistics on ethnicity gathered by the Swedish government.
Regardless, a discerning investigator can extrapolate from a variety of statistics, whether
peripheral or privately gathered measurements, the relative amount of immigrants in the
population and the ethnic arrangement of the Swedish population. The Swedish government
does keep statistics on the numbers of immigrants coming into the country each year, and has
done so since 1851. At this early period, immigration into Sweden was next to nothing, while
the population sat at just over three and a half million individuals. (Government of Sweden
2016d) A significant spike in emigration, primarily to the United States and also Australia,
occurred in the years characterized by the agricultural disaster known in Sweden as the “Final
Famine”; a devastating event that triggered a significant migration of a large portion of the
population, which during the period of time around 1866-1868 fled the country for these
hopefully greener pastures. (Akenson 2011) This period would not see the end of large-scale
Swedish emigration-rather, only the beginning, as large numbers of Swedes would emigrate to
America from 1880-onwards, until the flow finally ceased in the years leading up to World
War I.
Emigration and immigration would each remain low up until the post-World War II
period, at which point immigration would see a steady increase as Swedish economic prosperity
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beckoned. This would eventually lead to the government placing controls on immigration in the
early 1970s, requiring proof of employment offers and housing arrangements, among other
things, before individuals and families would be considered for approval for immigration.
(Government of Sweden 2016d)

Figure 7: Yugoslavian immigration to Sweden (Government of Sweden 2016d)
The start of the modern-day skyrocketing of immigration to Scandinavia arrived in the
1980s, when Sweden was one of the leading countries in taking in large numbers of asylumseeking individuals from conflict zones across the world, whether it be Chileans fleeing the
regime of Pinochet (45,000 Chileans currently reside in Sweden), Somali migrants, Iranian and
Iraqi civilians fleeing the brutal Iran-Iraq war (34,000 total form these countries alone in the
1980s), and others from countries as diverse as Eritrea and Lebanon. (Government of Sweden
2016d) Later, in the 1990s, Sweden would see a net uptick in gross immigration and in per
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capita immigration ratios, with over 100,000 Bosnians alone being granted asylum during the
decade.
This pattern is still manifesting to this day, as the Swedes continue to take in refugees
seeking safe haven as they flee from modern combat zones, such as Syria, Iraq, and Eritrea.
Only Germany took in more asylum seekers in 2014 than Sweden, despite a dramatic population
disparity between Sweden and Germany, and many of the countries in its regional sphere. In
2015, every fifth immigrant was from Syria alone, and the massive influx of refugees, especially
recently, as begun to manifest stresses in the general population. While surveys indicate that the
vast majority of Swedes approve of immigration as a whole, these same surveys also indicate
that the overall population feels as though the integration of immigrant populations could use
refinement on a variety of levels. (Government of Sweden 2016d) Unrest over this issue has
been seen as recently as the 2013 riots in the suburbs of Stockholm. Overall, the trend of ethnic
Swedish demographics has been one of a gradually escalating increase, with modest immigration
activity through the 1960s, speeding up and growing larger and larger into the modern day. This
trend of increased immigration has contributed as well to the overwhelmingly urban nature of the
Swedish population-more than 85% in 2015. (World Bank 2016b) How Swedes handle the
growing and concentrated influx of culturally different peoples in their society will be one of the
defining challenges of the upcoming decade for the country as a whole.

34

Figure 8: Citizen birthplaces over time in Sweden (Fredlund-Blomst 2014)
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Figure 9: Immigration over time versus recent immigration in Europe (OECD 2012)
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Figure 10: Birthplace of foreign-born Swedish residents (Statistics Sweden 2016a)
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American Demographics
America, unlike Sweden, is well known worldwide as a melting pot, a diverse assortment
of various peoples from a large number of world cultures. While slightly less urbanized than
Sweden, at an estimated 81% in 2015, America still experiences growing and concentrated
minority populations, and has a long history, unlike Sweden, of significant portions of the
population being of different ethnicities. The most historically noteworthy minority population
in the United States has been the African American population-originally imported largely as
slaves for southern plantation work, etc. this population has grown consistently over the last twoplus decades. In addition to the black population, other groups, such as Hispanics, persons of
Asian descent, and Native American populations have formed varyingly sizeable and significant
minorities in the United States throughout time and into the modern era. In the present day, one
American in six is deemed Hispanic in origin, and Native American populations have historically
existed, of course, since the dawn of the United States as a formalized nation-today they consist
of around one percent of the total population of the United States, which is calculated at just
under 309 million in 2010, and 321 million in 2015. According to the 2010 United States
Census, more than 1 in 10 American citizens were black, and one in twenty was of Asian
descent. The majority white population, as defined by the Census Bureau, registered just under
64% of the population in 2010, with that number decreasing steadily through successive census
counts. (US Census 2016a) This trend is expected to continue; The Economist estimated that
by 2050 one in four Americans will be Hispanic, and that does not even account for potential
growth in other minority groups. (Rennie 2015)
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Figure 11: Hispanic population density in the United States (Rennie 2015)
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Figure 12: African-American distribution in the United States (Encyclopedia Britannica Kids
2016)
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Figure 12: Asian-American population density in the United States (United States Census 2015)
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Figure 13: Native American population density in the United States (United States Census 2015)

Figure 14: Immigrant population share over time in the United States (Fredlund-Blomst 2014)
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Figure 15: Immigrant population versus percentage of the population in the United States
(Migration Policy Institute 2015)

Figure 16: Decadal representation of Immigrant population versus share of the United States
population (Batalova and Zong 2016)
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From these charts, it is easy to establish that, like Sweden, the United States has a
significant immigrant population. Unlike Sweden, however, it is also evident that the United
States’ significant immigrant populations have persisted further back in the history of the
country. While slaves are unusual immigrants compared to what are today considered modern
day immigrants, or even Swedish refugee-classified immigrants, forced immigration is still
immigration by all accounts, census statistics show that the black population in 1800 was
900,000 out of little more than 5.1 million Americans. This indicates that the American
immigrant population is both highly significant and endures all the way back to the foundation of
the United States in the 1770s. This is a sociological and demographic phenomena that very
obviously can lead to the affectation of social policies and agendas that could very conceivably
affect social welfare policy in a nation such as the United States. (United States Census 1790)
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Methodology
In the practice of the analysis of the rise of a social system as long in the making and as
complex as the social policies of an entire modern nation, as is such with the Swedish welfare
state, a particular manner of generalization must be embraced on a certain level at the very start
of a study in order to reach a feasible conclusion, lest one become bogged down in the mess of
mundane details affecting the peculiarities of such a large entity as the social welfare system of
an entire modern country consisting of millions of people. For example, while it is entirely
possible that tariff levels on imported grain in the mid-1800s may have had a trickle-down effect
leading to the promotion of Swedish agriculture at the time, and that may have been a precursor
to some sort of welfare relief among the hungry poor, it is more likely that that is but a spurious
variable distracting from a more pressing happenstance that more conclusively led to the
establishment of the modern Swedish welfare state. One must not only keep in mind the
potentially distracting nature of smaller variables like the aforementioned tariff levels on
imported grain, but also the potentially distracting nature of larger more significant seeming
variables.
It is with such an outlook that the analysis of the Swedish welfare state has been crafted;
with the specific intent of determining these particular significant groupings of events and
periods of crucial and significant importance, that the underlying aspects mainly driving the
creation of the Swedish welfare state can be identified, collected, summarized, and analyzed.
The matter by which this must be undertaken is almost entirely qualitative at its most basic,
beginning level. Quantitative facts, such as economic data concerning post-war prosperity,
population and demographic metrics, and election data concerning differences between Swedish
and American political practices, are useful to the analysis primarily once the primary areas of
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focus have been identified qualitatively. I argue that unless qualitative analysis can be used to
align identified phenomena and their respective timeframes together to establish a causal link
between the individual phenomena and the greater, cumulative, long-term effort of the creation
of the welfare state itself, no truly overarchingly meaningful conclusions can be reached.
These conclusions, however, can only be achieved through the accumulation of a series
of what are highly important quantitative statistics covering the multi-faceted conditions
surrounding the two welfare states seen and discussed in Sweden and the United States. The
most important of these critical quantitative variables are demographic, economic, and political.
Although the aforementioned qualitative aspect of the analysis is of primary importance, the
combination of relevant data sets from these areas, comparing and contrasting between United
States’ statistics and Swedish statistics, can provide essential causal links, demonstrating both
reasons for and against the creation and perpetration of the relative welfare states in both
countries. It is for this reason that we will attempt to establish a significant correlative link
between racial statistics, welfare spending, and many other statistical areas in discerning the
“push” behind the conception and continuation of these states.
Concerning the formational conditions surrounding the rise of the Swedish welfare state,
first, one must start by analyzing the changes necessary to begin the formation of such a social
welfare system. It is logically conclusive, given the natural uniqueness of the Swedish welfare
state, that a particular arrangement of events characterized by their selectively and consecutively
occurring nature must be present in such an environment in order to ensure the formation of
varying social policies forming the actual underlying bedrock of the Swedish-style social welfare
state. Given this logical assumption, it can then be assumed that a confluence of events from a
variety of different spheres-economic, political, demographic, etc.- impacting the creation and
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maintenance of the welfare state spheres would have to comport themselves in such a way as to
formulate the gestation of said welfare state. This identification of specific catalysts to the
creation of the oft-aforementioned social welfare system is best facilitated by first determining
the timeframe of the establishment of the social welfare system. This is less a matter of
academic investigation and more a simpler matter of a thorough examination of Swedish history,
specifically historical social welfare policymaking. Once potentially relevant have been
identified-through careful perusal of the historical record-a prudent researcher can then look
deeper into the factors behind these occurrences and determine the significant impacting factors,
be they economic, political, external, internal, etc. To summarize:


The timeframe of the establishment of the Swedish welfare state can be determined
through a recording of the timeframe in which the policies and relevant events that
contributed to the structure of the Swedish welfare state were enacted or occurred.



After determining the correct period, a researcher can then formulate a listing of potential
spheres of analysis through which to attempt to discern causality concerning the
aforementioned sphere and the formation of the welfare state. For example, economics,
politics, international relations, etc.



After determining the specific sphere of analysis, for example, economics, that influenced
the creation of the welfare state, more precise analysis can be undertaken to determine
both a timeframe of consequential events, policies, and proceedings, and a collection of
consequential events and proceedings. For example, perhaps World War 2 closely
coincides with the implementation of significant Swedish social welfare policies.
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After this narrowing down of analyses has completed, the researcher should be left with,
assuming a thorough approach to all of the aforementioned steps, a comprehensive listing
of potential significant factors leading to the formation of the Swedish welfare state.



These candidate significant factors can then be carefully analyzed qualitatively and
quantitatively to determine whether or not they provided significant impetus towards the
formation of the Swedish welfare state. As stated before, there is a significant amount of
difficulty and care must be taken in attempting to determine the difference between
variables contributing to the formation and evolution of the Swedish welfare state and
variables contributing to the evolution of the Swedish state, economy, and society as a
whole that may not have a significant impact on the welfare state itself.



The significant factors can then be compared to their American counterparts in an attempt
to determine with finality whether the country of the United States has had a window of
opportunity, as defined by a significant similarity in formational significant factors, for
the formation of a Swedish-style social welfare state. It is then a relatively simple matter
to determine either the correlation in the American social welfare system, or the lack
thereof. In such a case as the latter, it is postulated that the difference would be readily
identifiable based on the comparison of significant formational factors.

Through this analytical framework a variety of goals can be achieved. First, the
determination of the timeframe of the establishment of the Swedish welfare state. Second, the
identification of possible significant factors in said establishment. Finally, weeding out of these
factors to determine which are specifically related to the formation of the Swedish welfare state.
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These factors can then be compared to their American counterparts, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, in the hopes of determining whether the United States has had a window in which
the assumption of a Swedish-style social welfare state would have been feasible, and if such a
window does not exist, then it is hoped that continued analysis of the aforementioned factors can
lead to a satisfactory explanation.
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Results
In keeping with the first step of the proscribed methodology for determining the
significant factors behind the rise of the modern Swedish welfare state, it can be concluded that
the best course of action is to first identify events primarily critical to the development of the
Swedish welfare system. As such, it can be firmly noted that academic consensus and historical
record place the early concrete development, policy-wise, of the modern Swedish welfare state to
be around the turn of the 20th century, shortly following the rise of the Social Democrat party
which would rapidly grow to champion and drive these changes. Some of these policy
enactments are, in chronological order: in 1909 male suffrage was established, followed by
industrial safety laws (1912), old-age pension insurance (1913), universal suffrage for men and
women (1918), the establishment of the eight hour work day (1919), laws on collective
bargaining (1928), maternity benefits and maintenance allowances (1937), two weeks of holiday
leave minimum 1948), and general child allowances (1948). As the Swedish economy began to
boom in the post-war early 1950s period, additional reforms would arise, including three weeks
mandatory vacation (1953), national health insurance (1955), a forty five hour working week and
earnings-related pensions (1960), housing subsidies for families with children (1969), job
security legislation (1974), and reduced pension age (1976). (Heclo and Madsen 1987, 8)
Throughout this period of policy implementation, refinement of previously implemented social
welfare policies was on going; the workweeks’ length was steadily shortened, mandated vacation
time was steadily extended, and benefits were increased. (Heclo and Madsen 1987, 8) After this
time period, policy implementation took a back seat to policy refinement-new statutes and
policies were introduced less often, and existing policies and social welfare stratagems were
refined to allow for a more functional system. Therefore, having established a timeline for the
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concrete enactment of the social welfare system in Sweden, it was then prudent to look at this
time period, stretching roughly from way back in the early 1900s to the late 1970s, and peruse
this era through the lens of Swedish politics, policy, demographics, economics, international
relations, land reform, international trade, conflict, immigration, and whatever other factors
could potentially be significantly applicable to the establishment of this welfare system.
In the following examination of this era concerning varying potential applicable areas of
influence on the formation of the Swedish welfare state, a series of applicable areas were
identified as potentially housing more specific significant contributory factors to the rise of the
Swedish welfare state. These areas arrived at as potential candidates after months of analysis of
a multitude of previously cited works throughout this paper, were, specifically, land reform,
economic, political, and demographic. Land reform was selected based on the seeming
importance of the great and rather unusual for the time Swedish land reforms of the 1700s,
namely the storskifte of 1749 and the cumulative Land Survey ordinance of 1783. (Magnusson
2000, 15) It was postulated that these events would have had contributed to a socioeconomic
impetus driving the establishment of the modern day welfare state in Sweden.
No examination of the formative period of practically any social welfare system is
complete without a comprehensive analysis of the economic factors included in redistributive
efforts at the state level. Sweden is no different, with a number of critical economic events
occurring during the same period as the establishment of the welfare state itself. Among these
are the Great Depression of the 1930s and the post-war economic boom of the 1950s, 1960s, and
the early 1970s; up until the oil crisis and other events curtailed it somewhat.
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A third area of interest, politics, is readily apparent upon discovering that during this
formational period of Swedish welfare, a single party, the Social Democrat party, was in power
in Sweden for the greater part of the period mentioned previously in which the concrete policy
enactment took place, and were constantly in power in the Riksdag from 1932-1976; the primary
foundational period of Swedish social welfare policymaking. That this party was and is even
still today a primary driver of modern social welfare policy in Sweden would seem to indicate
their relation to the establishment of the welfare state.
The final identified area of significant interest, in the important effect it might have had
on the formation of the Swedish welfare state, was demographics; up until recently and certainly
during the aforementioned foundational period of the early-middle 1900s, Sweden experienced
relatively low levels of immigration, whereas the United States has experienced higher levels of
continuous immigration and the population itself has evolved into one of the largest countries on
Earth, cresting 323 million as of July 2016. (US Census 2016b) Sweden on the other hand, only
now approaches a population of 10 million, with official reports estimating the population at
around 9.8 million as of April 2016. (Statistics Sweden 2016b) Given prevailing racial attitudes
in both countries, this required further consideration concerning the potential importance of these
variables to both study site countries. This is especially critical given the significant role
possessed by racial bias in social welfare formation or lack thereof. Many who analyze
redistributive efforts have noted the influence of racial disparity and attitudes in the formation
and evolution of welfare states throughout history and across the world.
After the collection of these important factors for consideration, further work was done to
attempt to determine the legitimacy of the proposed areas as actual significant influences on the
rise of the welfare state. Of the four aforementioned areas that were considered, three were
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deemed conclusively significant as indicated by the research; economics, politics, and
demographics. Land reform, while significantly important to the history of Sweden itself and
what can only be assumed are a multitude of other geographic, historical, and sociological areas
of study, was deemed to be less than significant to the study of the formation of the Swedish
welfare state. Despite the highly unusual nature of the reforms for their time period, being
remarkably egalitarian and very much in contrast with overarching attitudes across Europe, no
significant connection was found in Swedish history to suggest a land reform jumpstarted a
social impetus for increasing redistributive policy.
Concerning the effect of economics on the rise of the social welfare system in Sweden,
several key time periods were identified that were crucial to its successful implementation.
Firstly, the industrial advances around the beginning of the nineteenth century, which laid the
framework for modern Swedish industrialization, would be an important contributor to future
highly significant economic upswings that would co-occur with and help to drive policy
implementation. Secondly, the Great Depression and World War II would provide both a taste
of hardship and the precursors to the expansion of the global economy. In addition, the events of
and the relatively advantageous position held by Sweden following the conclusion of World War
Two would lead to the most crucial of all of the economic indicators of the significant effect of
economics on the formation of Swedish welfare policies; the post-World War Two economic
boom, which would go hand in hand through the mid-1970s with the driving by the Social
Democrats of the meat of their social welfare agenda.
Demographics are, and have been, another key driver of Swedish social welfare policy in
the era of the evolution of its welfare state. As explained in detail in a variety of academic
articles, not the least of which a study by the Harvard Institute of Economic Research titled Why
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Doesn’t the US Have A European-Style Welfare State?, racial concerns belied by underlying
demographic arrangements can be a key contributor towards a lack of wealth redistribution
towards the poor-which would hamper, not help, the formation of a social welfare system such as
has been seen to arise in Sweden. In specific regard to the American comparison to the matter of
the Swedish welfare state formation, the Harvard report specifically states that their findings
indicated, “Racial animosity in the US makes redistribution to the poor…unappealing to many
voters.” (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001)
In an attempt to conclusively examine impact of racial bias on efforts to implement a
comprehensively redistributive system in the Swedish style, statistical analysis was undertaken
on the area of American demographics in an attempt to verify the significant impact of racial bias
on economic redistribution. Firstly, an analysis of American demographics and their relationship
to redistributive policy were deemed to be best examined on the state level, given comparative
ease of access to data and the ability to sort states by overriding political influence, be it of the
Democratic Party or the Republican Party. This was also thought to assist in determining
whether right or left leaning political alignments are more or less inclined towards more
redistributive welfare policies overall and also when sorted by racial group. Areas for which
data was compiled include urban, rural, and total state populations, welfare spending per capita
(defined as combined Medicaid and public assistance spending per capita), white, black, Asian,
and Hispanic percentages of state populations, welfare spending as a percentage of state GDP,
and whether or not the state is primarily Democratic or Republican. The latter was determined
by the simple process of counting the number of representatives and senators from the respective
states concerning their declared party; whichever party had the most representation was deemed
to hold influence in that state.
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From this data, a number of Pearson product-moment correlational analyses were
undertaken, which tested the correlational values of per capita welfare spending with varying
racial groups. Further specification was achieved by running the same tests but separating out
the data for Republican and Democratic states, in attempt to reveal whether left-leaning,
Democratic states, or right-leaning, Republican states, would be more inclined towards
redistributive efforts. Additional metrics were taken to determine average spending on welfare
as a percentage of GDP between Republican and Democratic states, non-white population
percentages between Republican and Democratic states, specific racial group population
percentages of states, and welfare spending per capita, again divided by state political alignment.
Given the Swedish example in particular, and similar European examples in general, it is
expected that left-leaning parties are more likely to support a larger scale of expansion and
development of welfare policies in the Swedish style. Considering again in combination with
this the prior assertion that racial bias drives a lack of redistributive efforts in the Swedish style,
it was hypothesized that the data analysis would show the left-leaning democratic states would
have higher correlations between redistribution and minority populations. At the same time, it
was expected that white populations would see higher rates of redistribution in right-leaning
states, given their status as the majority ethnicity.
Results for the Pearson product moment correlational analyses indicate much of what was
expected in terms of the demographically driven redistributive disparity among racial groups in
the United States. Given the results below, it is plain to see that when adjusting for state political
alignment, left leaning states show a higher correlational value between increased welfare
spending and racial minority populations as opposed to the right-leaning states.
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Per Capita Total Spending and White Population percentage .0049
Per Capita Total Spending and Black Population percentage -.2131
Per Capita Total Spending and Hispanic Population percentage -.0139
Per Capita Total Spending and White Population percentage (Republican States) .1798
Per Capita Total Spending and White Population percentage (Democratic States) .1547
Per Capita Total Spending and Black Population percentage (Republican States) -.3705
Per Capita Total Spending and Black Population percentage (Democratic States) .0931
Per Capita Total Spending and Hispanic Population percentage (Republican States) -.1462
Per Capita Total Spending and Hispanic Population percentage (Democratic States) -.0228

To summarize the above data, Republican states showed lower correlations between
welfare spending and Hispanic, Black, and White populations. Additionally, the correlational
value when looking at White population percentage and welfare spending was higher in
Republican states than in Democrat states, indicating a higher level of willingness to support
welfare among more homogenous populations. However, both states showed the highest
correlational values among those measured when looking at White Population percentage.
Demographically, Sweden, on the other hand, during the period established as
formational for the Swedish welfare state, has lacked the significant racial tensions and multiple
large minority populations inherent in the United States’ demographic arrangement. That
Sweden is possessed of significant minority populations is very obvious-the lasting presence of
the Sami has been noteworthy throughout Swedish history, and today they are granted a certain
elevated measure of autonomy in governing their own semi-independent affairs. Additionally, a
significant effort has been undertaken to ensure the attempted preservation of Sami culture.
(Government of Sweden 2016e) However, compared to the United States, Sweden has a very
low minority population. 89.3% of the population identifies themselves as specifically
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“Swedish”, with only a small fraction identifying themselves as another ethnic group. (This
compared to the United States, where minorities number in the low to mid 30% range.) Amongst
this minority group, further illuminating the relative homogeneity of the Swedish population,
native Sami people and Swedish Finns dominate. (Statistics Sweden 2016b)
In Anthony Smith’s arguments for the independence of “nations” and “states”, he goes so
far as to include Sweden in a very short list of states where the cultural unity is comprehensive
throughout the state’s territories, in the sense that the immigrant and minority native peoples of
Sweden do not impair the cultural unity of the country as a whole. The United States is not on
the short list.
He argues in addition that statewide institutions such as the Swedish social welfare
system function only in environments of widespread cultural homogeneity across a state’s
entirety-conditions, which he also argues do not exist in the United States. (Smith 1986 263)
Thomas Faist contends that America’s lasting racial divides have impeded any progress
by the generally labeled “social democrats” in establishing anything resembling the more
advanced social support structure seen in European states such as Sweden. (Faist 1995) These
demographic characteristics obviously cannot be taken as the sole overriding reason for the lack
of the development of a social welfare system similar to that of Sweden in the United States;
however, that it is a significant factor appears definite.
Politically, a series of events and proceedings were found to have provided a significant
impetus towards the foundation of the Swedish welfare state. As early as the turn of the first
millennia A.D., Viking regional taxation and country-wide institution implementation served as
obvious precursors for modern Swedish social institutions and policy arrangements. It is worth
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noting that similar historical parallels do not exist in American culture, given its relative youth as
a country and the suppression of Native American influence following the suppression of that
native population. Further events, such as the growing of power of the Riksdag in the 1700s and
1800s, and the formation of the Social Democrat party during the industrialization and
unionization spree that began in the late 1800s would also serve to drive the formation of the
welfare state in a multitude of significant fashions.
The political stability that is a commonplace stereotype of Sweden in particular and
Scandinavia as a whole was lent in large part to its modern reputation by the dominance of
Swedish politics during the 20th century and onwards by the Social Democrats, for whom the
modern Swedish social welfare state was a primary aspired goal; a goal which they were given
the political and economic opportunity to see through until its completion by the aforementioned
longevity of their dominant political interests in Sweden, which coincided in large part with the
post-World War Two economic boom. This continuity and clear access to purpose is a blatantly
obvious contributor to the establishment of a welfare state, and it is equally obvious that such a
parallel does not exist in the history of the United States. American political alignment being
much more polarized, it is noteworthy for a single party to remain in power beyond the term
limit of a single executive, never mind the decades of uninterrupted power enjoyed by the Social
Democrats. Judging by the Swedish model, the establishment of a welfare state is a lengthy,
decades long process, and given the readily apparent significance of political continuity, and the
lack thereof in the United States, it can be noted that this would form an impediment to the
formation of a Swedish style welfare state.
In brief summary, then, events have been organized under the auspices of three main
spheres of influence on the formation of the modern Swedish welfare state-events of economic,
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political, and demographic natures. In comparing these events to American history in an attempt
to find logical and suitable comparisons, some connections were made, while others were limited
to a certain extent. American economic indicators were found to correlate strongly with
Sweden-a post war boom is clearly seen, as are adverse effects from the Great Depression and a
lack of infrastructure damage from World War Two.

However, the other two key areas of

influence in Swedish social welfare state formation are not found to correlate significantly with
American historical record. American politics have for no reasonably comparable period of time
been dominated by a single party, never mind one of the inclination to provide a social welfare
net as broad as that implemented by the Social Democrats in Sweden over the course of 45+ odd
years. Additionally, American disregard for Soviet-related practices such as socialism led to an
inherent disregard for social welfare practices on the Swedish scale. (Alesina, Sacerdote, and
Glaeser 2001 26) Demographically, as well, America is unsuitable for the replication of the
conditions found in the formation of the modern Swedish welfare state. The significantly
increased presence of and marginalization of minorities in America as opposed to Sweden has
served to divide the population and prevent majority opinion swaying towards the redistribution
of wealth to these marginalized “otherized” populations. Statistical analyses determining the
nature of this disparity only serves to further illuminate the significance of these assertions.
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Thesis Discussion
Any dialogue regarding the events concerning the rise of the modern day Swedish social
welfare and their potential parallels in American history is incomplete without a comprehensive
analysis of the similarities and differences between the economics, politics, and demographics of
the two nations. In analyzing the differing aspects of these various spheres of two separate
nations as different and alike as the United States and Sweden, significant correlations and the
equally meaningful lacks thereof can be found; these qualitative conclusions and quantitative
datum can then be utilized to great effect in discerning the foundational aspects of the modern
day Swedish welfare system and its summary potential past-application to the United States of
America. In the analysis of the events leading to the rise of the Swedish welfare system, and in
summarily analyzing their potential counterparts in American economics, demographics, and
politics, it is clear that a number of observations can be made as to the nature of this relationship,
whether correlation exists between the varying spheres of connectivity or not.
No discussion of any social welfare system is complete without an underlying analysis of
the economic nature of the study site at hand. Social welfare systems are at their heart vessels of
the redistribution of wealth-mostly from richer, better-off individuals to those less well off, or
skirting the fringe of poverty. It is a logical fact that redistribution only functions effectively
when significant wealth is available for redistribution. What primarily, policy-wise, makes
Scandinavian-style social welfare states, most specifically Sweden, different from a welfare state
such as the modern American welfare state, is the scale and level of government involvement in
regulating and ensuring public health; through a relatively high level of influence over direct care
and public health insurance, public policymaking, and by way of benefits for workers, parents,
and students.
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Furthermore, the Swedish welfare state is different from the American welfare state,
(And an oft-used comparison for the American welfare state) given the relatively more positive
quality of life and economic equality indicators seen in Sweden versus the United States. US
News ranks Sweden’s quality of life as second in the world; Business Insider ranks them second
as well in the same metric, and the United Nations ranks Sweden’s human development index at
14th in the world. (US News 2016) (United Nations Development Programme 2014) (Willet
2013) At the same time, in all of these polls and almost every other poll and metric measuring
economic equality, quality of life, development, etc., the United States falls significantly behind
the Swedes. Many of the statistics use to calculate these figures, such as life expectancy and
Gini coefficients are a direct result of the influence or lack thereof of the welfare state in both
countries. From this, we can conclude at the very least the concept of a Swedish style welfare
state is an idea to be considered hypothetically concerning the potential benefits it might have on
American quality of life.
Regardless, it is obvious by a multitude of economic metrics-GDP PPP, GDP per capita,
etc., that Sweden is one of the most prosperous nations in Europe and certainly in the world as a
whole. This prosperity bloomed almost simultaneously alongside the constant implementation of
social welfare policies during the period from the start of the 20th century to the 1970s. Is it
essential to note the impact several formative historical events had on this correlation; the Great
Depression, the industrial growth of the 1800s, and specifically World War Two. It is not a prerequisite to the establishment of a social welfare state, in particular a Scandinavian-style heavy
benefits system, that the country sustain a lack of infrastructure damage during World War Two.
Countries such as the United Kingdom, Norway, and Denmark have notable levels of social
welfare policy implementation despite suffering from varyingly increased degrees of loss during
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World War Two. Regardless, the Swedes relatively undamaged position emerging from the
World War Two era into the post-war period gave them a leg up on their competitors in
emerging into the post Breton Woods/GATT world of economic globalization. This leg up, as it
were, alongside the unquestioned domestic popularity afforded the Social Democratic leadership
as a result of the co-occurring countrywide economic prosperity, served to drive policy
implementation. It is left inconclusively explained by this work as to whether the opposite is the
case-that the policies enacted by the Social Democrats during the post-war period contributed in
significant ways towards what can be clearly delineated by metrics as, even by the standards of
post-World War economic booms, remarkable economic progress in Sweden.
Demographically, a variety of important conclusions can be drawn that illuminate some
of the differences between America and Sweden, and, more specifically, their welfare policies.
Statistical analyses both from this paper and other sources support the assertion that
redistributive efforts in the United States are especially marginalized when higher non-majorityrace populations are present. At the same time, left-leaning states in the United States are more
likely to redistribute with the presence of higher minority populations as opposed to right-leaning
states. (Left-leaning states being more similar to the more mainstream Swedish political parties)
It is important to note that in the United States, both conservative and liberal parties both show
higher correlation between welfare spending and majority white populations than they do on
welfare spending and minority black and Hispanic populations. These two conclusions alone
support the idea that the relatively homogenous Sweden is more racially inclined towards
redistribution than the more heterogeneous United States.
At the same time, Swedish minorities trend much more towards the Caucasian majority
than in the United States-the major minority populations in Sweden are light-skinned peoples
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native to the area, whereas in the United States darker skinned populations of African Americans
and Hispanics often live in areas geographically distant compared to Swedish minorities. This
indicates that the perceived racial gap between the majority American racial group and the
majority Swedish racial group is even larger than a simple delineation by skin color; that the
racial gap is compounded not just by appearance and racial bias but by cultural and historical
differences which are manifest much more strongly in the United States. Summarily, it can be
assumed that racial bias in the United States significantly hampers redistributive efforts on a
scale not seen in Sweden.
In a similar pattern to that seen in the United States, the cessation of social welfare
policies correlated positively with the increased influx of immigrants to Sweden. Given the
aforementioned observation of the Harvard Institute of Economic Research, that American
welfare has been limited by social opposition to redistribution to the poor and to minority
populations, one must consider the concept of whether or not the influx of immigrants
contributed to this tailing off of welfare policy. However, given that the immigrant surge has
only just begun in Sweden, relative to the centuries of significant immigration in the history of
the United States, it is too early to accurately gauge its effectiveness at changing Swedish social
welfare policy. At the same time, the oil crises of the 1970s and the general economic downturn
of this period as the post-war boom tailed off in Sweden, amongst, among other things, increased
market competition from countries like Japan, may have contributed to this tailing off of
policymaking. Not only does this engender the follow-up question of what event(s) specifically
caused the tapering implementation of widespread new policy implementation in Sweden, but
also whether these events correlate to similar events in the United States, as the formational
events leading to the enactment of the policies did in a portion of the analyzed areas.
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At the same time, the origin of immigrants is an important complication in the discussion
of the effect demographics and ethnic minorities have on policy implementation. A large
amount of Swedish immigrants are refugees from war zones, while the vast majority of
American immigrants, historically, have been through the slave trade or, more recently,
immigrants searching for a brighter future in a perceived land of opportunity, often from at the
time beset European, Asian, or Central and South American locales. This variation is
undoubtedly a contributor to the different treatment received by immigrant populations in the
respective countries. (Smith 1986) It is thus possible, and worth examining further in a future
study, whether it is that the purpose of immigration is as important as the immigration of the
individual on its own in determining overall social reactions to immigration and the subsequent
reactions as seen through the lens of policymaking affected by said immigration.
Politically, the fact that the Social Democrats championed the formative nature of the
Swedish welfare state and shepherded it into its modern iteration, and continue to do so today, is
unquestionably a defining reason that the social welfare system has arrived at its particular state
of refinement in Sweden. The duration of their control of Swedish politics is remarkable in a fair
democratic society-it is rare that a single party holds power for more than a decade, never mind
more than four decades, during some of the most turbulent times of the 20th century. This
singular unity of Swedish politics, along with uncharacteristic, at least from an American
perspective, community-centered logic and empathy in policymaking seems deserving of special
mention. Regardless, the simplistic nature of their electoral dominance over Swedish politics
and their avowed devotion to redistributive and competitive social welfare programs endeavors
to create a mockery of in-depth analysis, as none is needed to see the role they played in the
formation of Swedish social welfare policy. That similar continuity would have a similar effect

64
on American politics is a logical assumption, however, the nature of the political party in
question would no doubt engender a measure of doubt as to the potential affectation of a more
comprehensive and redistributive welfare environment. For example, a modern day Republican
period of control lasting several decades would at this point be unlikely to result in increased
social welfare, especially given the statistical findings on redistributive hindrances in populations
that elect right leaning representatives.
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Thesis Conclusion
Implications
Research into the rise of the modern social welfare state system in Sweden has yielded
interesting datum concerning how the system came into being, and the identification of these
factors behind the foundation of the welfare system offer markers by which we can identify
similar situations in different countries. At the same time, if one intended to project the future
nature of a state’s welfare system, these variables could themselves be anticipated to see if such a
system’s formation could indeed perhaps be on the horizon.
Analysis of the history of Sweden indicated a variety of factors significant to the
formation of the modern Swedish welfare state. Economics, politics, and demographics were
identified as the key areas contributing to formation of the Swedish welfare state. Furthermore,
specific facets of these three spheres of study concerning the rise of social welfare were
recognized as especially formative aspects in their respective areas in regard to the impetus
behind the implementation of the social policies underlying the welfare system.
Economically, industrialization, World War Two, and the post-World War Two
economic boom were identified as key contributors towards the economic characteristics later
deemed necessary to formulate the modern day social welfare policies. Industrialization
centered on the end of the 19th century and the start of the 20th century set the stage for the
economic conditions necessary for the post-World War Two economic boom. World War Two
itself, while globally devastating, was less so for Sweden-despite economic interruptions and
rationing during wartime, along with the shrinkage of the Swedish export market during the war,
Sweden emerged into the post-war period with its infrastructure relatively intact, and in some
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industries new levels of productivity had been reached due to wartime demand for materials,
such as steel. (Magnusson 2000) The post-war boom in Sweden was driven by the increasing
globalization of world trade and the aforementioned head start enjoyed by Swedish industries,
given the lack of destruction visited upon the country during the conflict. Additional treaties
such as the GATT and the Breton Woods agreement also served to strengthen the post-war
economy. (Schön 2012)
Demographically, the relative homogeneity of the Swedish population until the bulk of
policy implementation passed in the mid-1970s was determined to be a significant factor in the
social support for the implementation of welfare policy-individuals were deemed more likely to
approve of redistributive government policy in the presence of a relatively homogenous
population. (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001) At the same time, comparative analysis of
Swedish and American demographics showed a decreased impetus for redistribution based on
higher minority populations in America as a whole. It can be safely concluded from this data
and other studies performed on the effects of racial bias on redistribution in America that the role
of racial bias is a significant one in the hindrance of redistributive efforts such as those in the
Swedish style.
Politically, the single greatest direct policy driver of Swedish welfare system
implementation during the 20th century was the Social Democrat party-founded in 1889 in close
concert with the unions also forming at the time, they would come into power in 1932 and
remain in leadership of the Riksdag and the Swedish government for more than forty years until
the economic unrest of the mid-1970s would unsettle the Swedish political machine. The
welfare state was the prime project of the Social Democrats, and they used their lengthy political
influence, the prosperity of the economy under their keeping, and the social support for the
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welfare state to implement and refine welfare in Sweden for more than 40 years, eventually
culminating in today’s modern Swedish welfare state.
Upon the individual analysis of each of these differing fields of study, geographic
analysis was essential to the tying together of varying loose ideas from each of these content
areas. The differing geographic scale of Sweden and the United States formed a major boundary
for cross-comparison between American and Swedish data sets, necessitating a combinative
analysis that was by necessity, geographic in nature. Only through such a broad lens could the
specific effects of homogeneity, economics, demographics, and political influence be measure
and compared effectively.
The Rise of the Welfare State in Sweden; a Correlating American Window?
Aspects of American society today, viewed from a certain angle, invite the attractiveness
of the Swedish social welfare state. An efficient, logical government, lower inequality, higher
benefits, free health insurance, cheap higher education, and a high standard of living and health
care all would be considerable draws towards the common middle and lower-class American
citizen. Therefore, the second phase of the research beyond the identification of the formative
aspects of Swedish social welfare asked if the same factors identified as significant contributors
to the rise of the modern Swedish social welfare state could be identified as similarly cooccurring in American history; in essence, was there a window in which an American social
welfare system could have been a reality? In short, this question has proven to be a dead end.
Indeed; the post-World War II economic framework favored America tremendously and during
this time the United States prospered economically, much as Sweden had in the same time
period. The economic framework for the establishment of a social welfare state was present.
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Indeed, as the world’s leading economy, one could argue that the economic window is still open
for America up to the modern day. Regardless, the other two spheres of influence on the rise of
the Swedish welfare state were rather remarkably different compared to their American
counterparts. While Sweden experienced relative demographic homogeneity during the period
of social welfare policy implementation, America has never really been demographically
homogenous since its foundation, and to exacerbate that discrepancy, while Sweden has a
relatively benign opinion of minority populations, America is not notable for such tolerance.
Oppression of minorities has been an American staple for hundreds of years, and even to this
day, for example, figures as elevated as presidential nominees continue to “otherize” minorities
to great popular appeal. This lack of demographic and cultural homogeneity has been shown
time and again by researchers from a myriad of fields to attribute directly to the impedance of the
implementation of any large-scale Swedish-style welfare system, particularly in America.
Additionally, American politics have a history of significantly more variance than
achieved by Swedish politics during the aforementioned policy implementation period in
Sweden. It can be safely assumed that a vast majority of Americans have never strongly
considered the notion that a single political party might dominate the government for more than a
handful of executive terms, never mind the four-plus decades of control enjoyed by the Social
Democrats. This lengthy time period is necessary to build the support and policy framework
necessary to build and refine a system as comprehensive and inclusive as the modern Swedish
welfare state, and the framework and the opportunity for this framework is lacking in America.
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Further Research
The broad nature of the research into the formative variables of an entire welfare state
brought into being over the course of decades concerns a number of factors and influencing
variables that beggars the imagination. Further examination of the intricacies of the interactions
between varying spheres of influence, both aforementioned (economic, political and
demographic) and not, would surely only serve to highlight more questions regarding the role of
various factors in the impetus to bring about the formation of the welfare policies. Did the
proximity of communist Russia have an influence on the relatively redistributive Swedish
system? Did the relative lack of a classical Middle Ages feudal system in Sweden make a
difference in the rapid adoption of a Scandinavian-style social welfare state? To what degree did
ostensible Scandinavian unity have on the formation of not just the Swedish welfare state, but the
Finnish, Norwegian, Danish, and Icelandic states as well? In regards to the comparison of
Swedish welfare-formative factors with their proposed potential American counterparts, what
role does the classification of immigrants play in the adoption of redistributive policies? Are
Swedish refugees from dangerous combat zones viewed differently than American immigrants
from around the world? Did the American legacy of slavery affect redistributive policy towards
a poor population composed disproportionately of members of this formerly oppressed
population? As with the research question itself, further inquiries can only be defined by the
limits placed upon them, not the limits created by their analysis.
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Appendix

Swedish Timeline
1860- Sweden Begins Trek Toward Modern Industrialization
1889- Social Democrat Party Founded
1909- Male Suffrage Established
1912- Industrial Safety Laws
1913- Old-age Pension Insurance
1917- Communists Split from Social Democrat Party
1918- Universal Suffrage
1919- Eight Hour Workday
1928- Collective Bargaining Legislation
1932- Social Democrats, led by Per Albin Hansson, Establish a Minority Government
1937- Maternity Benefits and Maintenance Allowances
1939- World War Two Begins
1944- Breton Woods Agreement Signed
1945- World War Two Ends
1948- GATT Comes Into Effectiveness
1948- Two Weeks Minimum Holiday Leave
1949- General Child Allowances
1950- General Period of High Economic Prosperity Begins
1953- Three Weeks Minimum Holiday Leave
1955- National Health Insurance
1960- Forty-five Hour Work Week, Wage-related Pensions
1968- First Major Spike in Immigration in Sweden
1969- Housing Subsidies for Families with Children
1974- Job Security Legislation
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1976- A Coalition Wrests Government Control from the Social Democrats
1976- Reduced Pension Age

